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Abstract
Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms,
namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and
norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of
fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable
behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair,
but also believed that recipients found it fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be unfair. In
contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they could do so without the recipient's
knowledge, individuals made uneven offers despite knowing that their behaviour was unfair.
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Abstract. Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two 
phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an 
interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the 
deliberate, private violation of a social norm.  We found that the manipulation of a 
norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what 
constituted normatively acceptable behavior, so that an individual who made an 
uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed 
that recipients found it fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be 
unfair. In contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they 
could do so without the recipient’s knowledge, individuals made uneven offers 









Multiple interpretations of a social norm often exist. For example, there is a social 
norm of leaving 15-20% of the bill in gratuity when dining in the United States, as 
long as service was at least adequate. Norm manipulation is the selection of the 
interpretation of a norm that best suits an individual (Bicchieri, 2006; Bicchieri & 
Chavez, 2010) – in this case, leaving 15% instead of 20%. Bicchieri & Chavez 
(2010) hypothesized that individuals are prone to a self-serving bias in that they 
adopt beliefs that justify their manipulation of a norm.
. 
 Self-serving biases are 
common, and are often rationalized as justifiable by the involved party (Messick 
and Sentis 1983; Babcock et al. 1995; Konow 2000; Epley and Caruso 2004; 
Bicchieri and Mercier 2012).  A considerable psychological literature in motivated 
reasoning shows that people have minimal standards when it comes to self-
justifications: not every behavior can be adequately rationalized (Kunda, 1990; 
Mercier & Sperber, 2011). One way to justify a self-serving interpretation of a norm 
is to hold a second-order belief that supports it, i.e. a belief that other parties would 
find that interpretation acceptable and endorse it.  We explore this hypothesis 
empirically by measuring first and second-order beliefs of two parties whose 
monetary interests in a bargaining situation were not aligned.   
Related to norm manipulation is norm evasion – the deliberate, private 
violation of a norm.
1
 When information is private to one or more parties, there is the 
temptation to use this information to one’s advantage, avoiding norm-abiding 
behavior. Consider a person who wants to buy a much-coveted ticket. He knows 
there will be a long line, and those at the end of the line may find that all tickets have 
been sold.  He could try to arrive very early, but instead he decides to take it easy 
                                                 
1
 We reserve the term “norm transgression” to the open and public flaunting of a social norm such as, for example, 
cutting a line with no justification, or refusing to contribute to the Christmas’ present to the department secretaries 
when it is public knowledge that no hardship has befallen the non-contributor.    
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and arrive with a fake bandage on his foot and a cane.  He expects people to allow 
him to go first, as waiting in line would cause him unnecessary hardship.  His 
private information serves him well, as he can cut the line with impunity
2
.  This is 
admittedly an extreme case of norm evasion, but less wacky occurrences are far 
more frequent (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). We directly tested for norm evasion 
by measuring whether individuals chose uneven monetary splits in a bargaining 
game, despite believing that it was normatively unacceptable and that others 
believed the same. 
Measuring second-order beliefs presents several advantages.  On the one 
hand, mutually consistent second-order normative beliefs suggest that a norm is 
present.  This occurs when most people believe that most people think one should 
behave in a particular way.  On the other hand, measuring second-order beliefs 
allows us to discriminate among types of players, and predict under which 
conditions we might expect norm compliance.  For example, a player who 
consistently chooses an equal share in an Ultimatum game may be deemed to be 
generous, but what if that player believes that only an equal share will be acceptable 
to her opponent, whereas she also believes that less generous shares are perfectly 
fair? Such a player may be expected to rationally choose a much less equitable share 
if the situation allows her to do so with impunity.  To explore the possibility of such 
differences in beliefs and motives, we focus on multivariate techniques that can 




                                                 
2
 Old comic Italian movies often depict a scoundrel (the actor Toto`) who regularly engages in such antisocial behaviors. 
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Background 
Tipping in the United States, not cutting in front of others who are waiting in 
line, and paying for dinner or splitting the bill are all examples of social norms. They 
are not universally followed rules (leaving a gratuity in Japan is not considered 
appropriate), nor are they unconditionally followed rules (if enough people are 
disregarding the long queue for the highway exit, one might be inclined to cut to the 
front as well). A social norm may be formally defined as a behavioral rule such that 
sufficiently many people know it exists and prefer to follow it under the condition that 
they believe that sufficiently many others will (a) also conform to the rule (empirical 
expectation) and b) expect them to follow the rule and may be willing to sanction 
deviations from it (normative expectation) (Bicchieri, 2006, p.11).
3
 This definition 
implies that a norm may exist and not always be followed, since individuals may not 
have the appropriate empirical and/or normative expectations.  It is also the case that 
different individuals may have different sensitivities to a given norm.  For a player 
who does not care much about a norm, the expectation of negative sanctions will be 
necessary to induce conformity and if transgressions are difficult to detect, some 
people will be tempted to evade a norm.  In ambiguous situations in which more than 
one norm may apply, or different ‘interpretations’ of a norm may be available, self-
serving biases may induce individuals to discount a norm in favor of another that they 
prefer (Xiao and Bicchieri 2010) or to choose an interpretation that favors them.  For 
example, when ‘fair’ divisions can be interpreted according to equality or equity rules 
(Van Avermaet 1974; Messick and Sentis 1983; Konow 2000), individual preferences 
over outcomes tend to determine the interpretation of fairness one adopts.  In this 
case, it looks as if individuals ‘choose’ what to believe. Eliciting second-order beliefs 
                                                 
3
 Note that normative expectations are second-order beliefs about what others believe one ought to do, and thus differ 
from second-order empirical expectations (what others expect one to do), as well as from first-order normative beliefs 
(what one thinks he ought to do.) 
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would show that individuals also attribute to others the kind of beliefs that justify their 
own choices.   
To test the hypothesis that norm manipulation and norm evasion are two very 
different phenomena, we focused on a version of the Ultimatum Game (Guth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) in which Proposers proposed a division of a sum 
of $10.00 to Responders, who accepted or rejected the offer.  In the case of a 
rejection, both parties got nothing.  On average, Proposers make offers that are 40-
50% of the total amount, and Responders reject offers below 20% about half of the 
time (Camerer, 2003). This suggests that there is a shared norm of fairness as 
(roughly) equal division in the standard Ultimatum Game. However, subtle 
manipulations of the Ultimatum Game can create multiple interpretations of what 
constitutes fair behavior. For example, instead of specifying that each party earns 
nothing if the Responder rejects, Knez & Camerer (1995) assigned payoffs of $3.00 
to the Proposer and $2.00 to the Responder in case of rejection. Under the 
interpretation of fairness as equality in payoffs, offers of $5.00 are fair. However, 
because the Responder can earn $2.00 by rejecting, another interpretation of fairness 
is equal division of the surplus above the outside offers.  In this case the Proposer’s 
offer of (5.50, 4.50) equalizes the difference between received and foregone payoff 
(5.50 – 3 = 2.50, and 4.50 – 2 = 2.50). Whereas average rejection rates typically are 
5-25%, in the study of Knez & Camerer (1995) rejection rates were close to 50%. 
They interpret their results by suggesting that Proposers and Responders adopted 
self-serving beliefs about what constituted a fair offer.  Yet since they were 
comparing rejection rates in a game with two focal divisions to those in a game with 
only one focal division, their conclusion that a self-serving bias is at work is not 
necessarily warranted.  Assessing Proposers’ and Responders’ first and second-order 
 6 
beliefs about fair divisions would have provided a better assessment of the presence 
of self-serving interpretations of fairness. 
 Kagel, Kim, & Moser (1996) asked Proposers and Responders to bargain over 
100 chips which were worth three times as much for one of the players ($0.30 vs. 
$0.10 per chip). When chips were worth more for Proposers, and this was common 
knowledge, both Proposers and Responders adopted self-serving fairness beliefs: 
Proposers offered slightly more than half the chips, which was an offer of only 1/4
th
 
of the money (instead of 75% of the chips, which would be an offer of half the 
money), and Responders rejected roughly half the time.  Clearly Proposers wanted to 
offer a fair share of the chips, whereas Responders thought they should get a fair 
share of dollars.  
 Although the authors of these studies inferred that individuals adopted self-
serving interpretations about what constituted fair behavior, they did not directly 
measure fairness beliefs, and instead based their inferences on behavior alone. At 
least two mechanisms could give rise to such behavior. On the one hand, Proposers 
might genuinely believe that uneven monetary splits are fair. On the other hand, 
Proposers might believe that uneven monetary splits are unfair, but believe that 
Responders believe that such splits are fair. Uneven offer behavior is consistent with 
either explanation, but the psychological mechanisms underlying these two 
explanations are different. In the first case, a self-serving bias leads Proposers to 
consider uneven splits to be fair. Given that both even and uneven splits are thought 
to be fair, Proposers choose the one that yields a higher payoff. This seems to occur 
in the Knez and Camerer experiment, as well as in the Kagel et al. experiment when 
players had common knowledge of the different monetary conversion values.  In the 
second case, Proposers suffer no self-serving bias, and knowingly make an unfair 
offer because Responders lack full information. An example of such patently unfair 
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behavior occurs in the Kagel et al. (1996) experiment. When only Proposers knew 
that the chips were worth three times as much for them, they offered, on average, 
only half of the chips. In this case, rejections were low (and likely expected to be 
low). Had Proposers been fair, they should have offered ¾ of the chips to 
Responders.  
To distinguish between these possibilities, we extended the design of 
Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) which used an Ultimatum Game variant to a) allow 
multiple interpretations of what constituted a fair offer and b) create informational 
asymmetries between Proposers and Responders. Whereas that study did not 
measure Proposers’ first-order fairness beliefs, making it impossible to determine 
whether norm manipulation or norm evasion occurred, the present study measured 
both Proposers’ and Responders’ first and second-order fairness beliefs, allowing us 
to directly assess the presence of norm manipulation and norm evasion.  
 
Methods 
Participants. 64 college-age participants took part in our study across 6 experimental 
sessions. Advertisements specified that participants would earn 5 USD in addition to 
an amount that would depend on decisions made during the experiment. 
Game Paradigm. Our experimental design employed a variant of the Ultimatum 
Game in which one participant, the Proposer, provisionally received a sum of 10 
USD – provided by the experimenter – and then proposed a division of that money 
to an anonymous Responder. The Responder subsequently decided to accept or 
reject the proposal. If the Responder accepted, both players received the amounts 
specified in the proposal. If the Responder rejected, both players received $0. The 
Proposer chose from one of the following options: 
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(5,5) – to propose $5 for the Proposer and $5 for the Responder; 
(8,2) – to propose $8 for the Proposer and $2 for the Responder;  
Coin – to let the outcome of a fair coin flip determine the proposal: Heads 
corresponded to (5,5) and tails to (8,2). 
 
Procedure. An experimenter randomized participants into one of two rooms upon 
their arrival, which determined whether they would be a Proposer or a Responder for 
the duration of the study. We distributed and read aloud instructions that explained 
the Ultimatum Game, that participants would play three such games with a different 
person chosen at random in the other room, that all choices and responses were 
strictly anonymous, and that participants would be paid in cash at the end of the 
experimental session for two of the three games chosen at random. Before each 
game, an experimenter provided additional written instructions to participants and 
read them aloud. Participants also took a short quiz to ensure that they understood 
these instructions. After completing the quiz, but prior to making or receiving a 
proposal, Proposers and Responders completed questionnaires that measured their 
empirical expectations and first- and second-order fairness beliefs (normative 
expectations). Finally, Proposers completed proposal forms and Responders 
responded to them. The full set of instructions and proposal forms can be found in 
Online Appendices A and B. 
Fairness Beliefs and Empirical Expectations. Online Appendices C and D show the 
questionnaires that were used to measure Proposers’ and Responders’ empirical 
expectations and first- and second-order fairness beliefs (normative expectations). 
Table 3 also provides a condensed listing of the questions. Items regarding the Coin 
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option were omitted in the private condition, as Responders did not know that the 
Coin option was available in that condition, and Proposers understood this. 
The questionnaires allowed us to measure whether each Proposer considered 
each choice option to be fair by condition, Proposers’ beliefs about Responders’ and 
other Proposers’ fairness beliefs, Proposers’ beliefs about Responders’ behavior 
conditional on each offer, and various Responders’ beliefs. These belief variables 
allowed us investigate the presence of norm manipulation, norm evasion, and which 
beliefs were most relevant to Proposers’ choices. 
Information Condition. Participants played three Ultimatum Games under different 
information conditions in a fixed-order, within-subjects design. In the full 
information condition, Proposers marked on a proposal form whether their choice 
was (5,5), (8,2), or Coin. Subsequently, the experimenter in the room of Responders 
publically flipped a coin. On any forms on which the Proposer chose Coin, the 
experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the coin flip outcome. Thus, all 
participants understood that the Coin option was available and that Responders 
would know if the Proposer with whom they were paired chose Coin.  
In the private information condition, Responders did not know that Coin was 
available to Proposers, and Proposers were aware of this fact. To create this 
informational asymmetry, we left Coin off of the proposal form, but allowed 
Proposers to choose Coin by leaving the remaining options ((5,5) and (8,2)) 
unmarked on the form. An experimenter in the room of Proposers then flipped a 
coin. On any forms on which the Proposer chose Coin, the experimenter marked 
(5,5) or (8,2), based on the coin flip outcome. Thus, Responders only saw a form 
with either (5,5) or (8,2) marked, and were unaware of the existence of the Coin 
option. 
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In the limited information condition, all participants knew that the Coin option 
was available, but that the Responder would not be able to distinguish whether the 
Proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2) directly, or chose Coin whose outcome was (5,5) or 
(8,2). To create this information condition, we listed (5,5), (8,2), and Coin on the 
proposal form, but instructed all participants that Proposers could only choose Coin 
by leaving all options unmarked. After Proposers made their choices, the 
experimenter in the room of Responders privately flipped a coin. On any forms on 
which the Proposer chose Coin, the experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the 
coin flip outcome. 
We fixed the order of conditions as 1) full, 2) private, and 3) limited because a 
different ordering led to confusion in pilot studies. Because we did not provide 
Proposers with feedback between conditions, and because participants only played 
three games, we expected any effects of learning without feedback (Weber, 2003) to 
be minimal.  
 
Results 
Testing hypotheses about individual motives for action requires that we 
assume there is consistency between individual beliefs and behavior. This is 
especially important when beliefs refer to other players’ beliefs and behavior, since 
one’s choices in strategic situations are conditional on those beliefs. It is a basic 
practical rationality assumption that cannot be abandoned if we want to retain 
predictability.
4
  In what follows we shall examine two main hypotheses about 
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 By practical rationality we mean the rationality of an action, given a player’s beliefs.  Beliefs may be crazy (i.e., 
epistemically irrational), but as long as an individual acts according to her beliefs she is practically rational.  
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motives: Profit maximization and social norms.  Analysis of belief-choice pairs 
consistency provides support for the latter hypothesis only.  
Common Knowledge of Profit Maximization Hypothesis. We begin by testing the 
basic hypothesis that participants only care about their monetary payoffs. This 
hypothesis is usually accompanied by an assumption of risk neutrality, and in what 
follows we shall assume risk neutrality throughout. Under the assumptions that 
participants sought to maximize their individual monetary gains and that this was 
common knowledge: 
1) No Responder should ever reject any of the three possible offers, because 
accepting any offer yields a positive payoff and rejecting yields a payoff of $0.00, 
2) Proposers should therefore: 
a. Always believe that Responders will accept any positive offer, 
b. Always propose (8,2), because conditional on the Responder accepting, (8,2) 
maximizes the Proposer’s payoff. 
As Table 1 shows, respectively in the full, private, and limited information 
conditions, Responders rejected (8,2) offers 1 of 4 times (25%), 4 of 11 times (36%), 
and 5 of 16 times (31%), contrary to the first prediction. Moreover, as Table 2 
shows, between 15 of 31 (48%) and 25 of 32 (78%) of Proposers, depending on the 
condition, believed that fewer than half of Responders would accept (8,2), contrary 
to prediction 2a. Finally, as Figure 1 shows, between 16 of 32 (50%) and 28 of 32 
(88%) of Proposers, depending on the condition, did not choose (8,2), contrary to 
prediction 2b. Thus, as expected, there was strong evidence against the hypothesis of 
common knowledge of profit maximization. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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Profit Maximization Without Common Knowledge Hypothesis. It was possible that 
Proposers sought to maximize their monetary gains, but did not know whether 
Responders would do the same. According to this hypothesis, Proposers who are risk 
neutral would make an offer that yielded the highest expected value based on their 
beliefs about Responder behavior. Although we did not measure Proposers’ exact 
probabilistic beliefs of whether the Responder would accept a particular offer, we 
recorded whether each Proposer believed the majority of Responders would accept a 
particular offer. Table 2 tabulates these responses. 
 
 
[Table 2 here] 
Because 100% of Proposers believed the majority of Responders would accept (5,5), 
regardless of the information condition or offer source, the expected value of (5,5) 
was $5.00. It follows that a profit-maximizing Proposer who believed half or fewer 
than half of Responders would accept (8,2) would never propose (8,2), because the 
expected value of choosing (8,2) was at most $4.00. Such Proposers would also 
never choose Coin, because E[Coin] = $2.50 + $4.00q ≤ $4.50, where q ≤ .5 is the 
Proposer’s unmeasured belief about the proportion of Responders who would accept 
(8,2). Thus, we predicted that no Proposer would choose (8,2) or Coin if they 
believed half or fewer than half of Responders would accept (8,2). 
Contrary to this prediction, of the Proposers who believed half or fewer of 
Responder would accept (8,2), 3 of 15 proposed (8,2) in the private condition, 3 of 9 
proposed (8,2) in the limited condition, 1 of 7 proposed Coin in the full condition, 
and 2 of 9 proposed Coin in the limited condition. The non-zero proportion of 
Proposers who chose (8,2) or Coin implies inconsistent belief-choice pairs among at 
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least some subjects under the profit maximization hypothesis, providing evidence 
against this hypothesis.  
Finally, of the choices of the remaining Proposers – those who believed the 
majority of Responders would accept (8,2) – 20 of 96 (21%) were Coin. According 
to the (risk neutral) profit maximization hypothesis, however, such Proposers should 
never strictly prefer coin, because when q > 5/8, choosing (8,2) uniquely maximizes 
expected value, whereas when q < 5/8, choosing (5,5) uniquely maximizes expected 
value.
5
 In sum, there was substantial evidence that Proposers did not simply 
maximize expected value conditional on their beliefs about Responder behavior. 
Social Norms Hypothesis. Theories of monetary gains maximization were not 
sufficient to explain participants’ behavior. Moreover, profit maximization theories 
are agnostic as to why Proposers’ beliefs and behavior varied across information 
conditions, even when monetary consequences were held fixed. The theory of social 
norms we adopt predicted that participants would be focused on different fairness 
norms when we manipulated their first- and second-order fairness beliefs defined, 
respectively, as 1) which offers they considered fair, and 2) which offers they 
believed others considered fair. Before analyzing the belief data, however, we first 
tested our primary hypotheses concerning behavior by analyzing the distribution of 
offers across information condition.  
Predictions about Frequencies of Behavior by Condition. In the full information 
condition, because information about the coin flip was complete (whether the 
Proposer chose to flip a coin and the outcome of the coin flip were both public 
knowledge) and normative expectations for coin were present
6
, we expected more 
                                                 
5
 When q = 5/8, the Proposer is indifferent amongst the three choices, and one might argue that such Proposers chose 
Coin; however, such an explanation places an unreasonable prior distribution on q. 
6
 In the full information condition, Proposers believed that 76% of Responders considered Coin to be fair (see Table 3). 
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coin choices in this condition relative to the others. In the limited information 
condition, because Proposers could take advantage of the ambiguity created by the 
opacity of the offer source (an offer of (8,2) could have been generated by a Coin 
choice, and the Responder could not determine whether the Proposer chose coin), we 
expected the highest frequency of (8,2) choices. Finally, Proposers essentially faced 
a choice between (5,5) and (8,2) in the private condition, as the Coin choice was not 
known to Responders, and thus there were no normative expectations to choose 
Coin; we therefore expected the highest frequency of (5,5) choices in this condition. 
Figure 1 shows aggregated offer proportions by condition. Fisher’s exact test 
rejected the null hypothesis of no association between offer and condition (p = 
.0012). The hypothesis that (5,5) offers were more likely in the private condition 
than the other conditions was not supported by Fisher’s one-sided exact test (OR = 
1.64, p = .1739). However, (8,2) was more likely in the limited condition than in the 
other conditions (OR = 2.85, p = .0187), and Coin was more likely to be selected in 
the full condition than in the other conditions (OR = 7.34, p = .0002), as expected. 
Planned follow-up permutation tests
7
 (p-values uncorrected) revealed that the effect 
of (8,2) in the limited condition was attributable to a difference from the full 
condition (OR = 6.18, p < .0001) but not the private condition (OR = 1.68, p = 
.1331). On the other hand, the effect of Coin in the full condition was attributable to 
a difference from the limited condition (OR = 7.52, p = .0080) or the private 
condition (OR = 7.52, p = .0080). 
 Therefore, we found support for two of our three primary hypotheses, 
reproducing the basic findings of Bicchieri and Chavez (2010). Whereas the 
proportion of (5,5) offers stayed constant across conditions, (8,2) was more likely in 
                                                 
7
 Directional hypotheses such as πCoin|Full > πCoin|Private (where πi|j = Pr(Choice=i | Condition=j)) can be tested using permutation 
tests which are exact up to randomization error and respect the dependence of the within-participants design.  
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the limited condition, in which Proposers could take advantage of the ambiguity of 
the source of their offer, and Coin was more likely in the full condition, in which 
Proposers could not ignore normative expectations to make a fair offer, and their 
second-order beliefs (normative expectations) about Responders indicated Coin was 
believed to be fair by a large majority of Responders.  
 
 
Figure 1. Proportions/counts of (5,5), (8,2), and Coin choices (indexed by lines 
labeled 5, 2, and C) by condition. N = 32 for each condition. 
 
Fairness Beliefs. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the 19 variables that 
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Responders’ belief data. We omitted most belief variables involving (5,5), as 
participants universally considered (5,5) to be fair and believed that (5,5) would be 
accepted by the majority of Responders.  
Responders’ beliefs about the proportions of Proposers who would choose 
(5,5), (8,2), and Coin were largely insensitive to experimentally created 
informational asymmetries, as indicated by the constancy of expected proportions of 
(8,2) and Coin choices across information conditions. Responders believed, 
however, that there would be a dramatic increase in the proportion of (5,5) choices 
in the private condition, although they expected the proportion of (8,2) choices to 
stay the same as in the full and limited information conditions. Thus, they believed 
that a stable fraction of Proposers would choose Coin when it was an available 
option, but would instead choose (5,5) when it was unavailable; that is, Responders 
believed Proposers had a conditional preference for choosing Coin. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Norm Manipulation. Both Proposers and Responders generally considered (8,2) to 
be unfair, and believed that others considered it to be unfair. The proportion of 
Proposers who considered (8,2) to be fair did not differ from the proportion of 
Responders who considered it to be fair (χ2(1) = 1.90, p = .17, in the full condition; 
χ2(1) = 0.00 in the private condition; and χ2(1) = 0.87, p = .35, in the limited 
condition). However, more Proposers than Responders considered Coin to be fair, 
both in the full information condition (81% vs. 52%, χ2(1) = 6.93, p = .0085) and in 
the limited information condition (72% vs. 43%, χ2(1) = 6.35, p = .0117). Second-
order beliefs about the fairness of Coin exhibited the same pattern; in the full 
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information condition, Proposers believed 76% of Responders considered Coin fair, 
whereas Responders believed only 46% of Responders considered Coin fair (t(61) = 
3.70, p < .001), and in the limited information condition, the respective figures were 
62% and 39% (t(62) = 2.46, p = .0168). Thus, when multiple interpretations of a 
social norm were available (many Responders believed that Coin, in addition to 
(5,5), was fair), Proposers exhibited a self-serving bias in both first- and second-
order beliefs about the fairness of Coin.  Under an alternative theory of self-serving 
norm manipulation, individuals who offered Coin could have believed that Coin was 
unfair, but that Responders considered it to be fair. However, 11 of the 14 Proposers 
who chose Coin in the full information condition believed that Coin was fair. Thus, 
taken together, these findings provided evidence of a particular brand of norm 
manipulation, in which individuals adopted an interpretation of a norm that best 
suited them, while simultaneously exhibiting self-serving biases in their first- and 
second-order beliefs about the normative acceptability of that interpretation.
8
  
Norm Evasion. We hypothesized that Proposers who chose (8,2) in the limited 
information condition did so despite believing that (8,2) was unfair, and despite 
believing that most Responders and other Proposers considered (8,2) to be unfair. In 
the limited condition, because Responders could not distinguish between 1) a choice 
of (8,2), and 2) a Coin choice that resulted in an offer of (8,2), Proposers could 
deliberately ignore normative expectations. By measuring Proposers’ fairness 
beliefs, we were able to directly test for the presence of norm evasion. 11 of the 15 
Proposers who chose (8,2) in the limited condition believed that (8,2) was not fair. 
Moreover, Proposers who chose (8,2) in the limited condition believed on average 
that only 34% of other Proposers and 21% of Responders thought (8,2) was fair. 
                                                 
8
 Similar observations about self-serving interpretations of norms in Trust games (equality versus reciprocity) were 
made by Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) and Bicchieri and Mercier (2012).  
 18 
Thus, we found direct evidence that Proposers intentionally ignored normative 
expectations in the limited condition in order to evade a norm of fairness.   
Structure of Fairness Beliefs. To explore the heterogeneity in Proposers’ beliefs, we 
subjected the 19 variables comprising the Proposers’ belief data to an exploratory 
factor analysis. We selected a four-factor solution based on tests successive 
significance tests at the alpha = .05 level (oblimin rotated). 
9
 
Table 4 shows the resulting factor solution. The pattern of loadings led to four 
clearly interpretable factors with a simple structure. Factor 1 loaded on Proposers’ 
first- and second-order beliefs about the fairness of (8,2). Proposers with high scores 
on Factor 1 believed that (8,2) was fair across conditions, and that other Proposers 
and Responders also believed (8,2) was fair. Factors 2 and 4 loaded on beliefs about 
the fairness of Coin in, respectively, the limited information condition and the full 
information condition. Proposers with higher scores on Factor 2 believed that Coin 
was fair in the limited information condition, and that other Proposers and 
Responders believed the same; those with higher scores on Factor 4 had analogous 
beliefs about the fairness of Coin in the full information condition. Finally, Factor 3 
loaded on beliefs about whether the majority of Responders would accept (8,2). 
Thus, Factors 1, 2, and 4 represented Proposers’ first- and second-order normative 
beliefs about (8,2) and Coin, whereas Factor 3 represented profit-maximizing 
considerations. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                 
9
 This method of assessing factorial dimensionality, introduced by Horn (1965), has been shown in simulation studies 
(Zwick & Velicer, 1986) to be more effective at identifying the true number of factors than either the observed root-
one rule (Kaiser, 1960) or the scree plot (Cattell, 1966), in some circumstances by large margins (e.g., 92% accuracy 





Fairness Beliefs as Predictors of Behavior.  
To investigate whether beliefs predicted choices, we entered standardized regression 
factor scores (Thurstone, 1935) into multinomial logit models of choices, and used 
AIC-based stepwise variable selection to find a set of informative factors.
10
 Table 5 
shows the logit estimates of the resulting models, and Figures 2-4 plot the 
corresponding predicted choice probabilities by factor scores. 
 In the full information condition, the two factors retained had qualitatively 
similar effects on choice probabilities. For Proposers with extremely low scores on 
Factor 1 or Factor 3 – respectively reflecting the belief that (8,2) was unfair and that 
others agreed and the belief that Responders would reject (8,2) – the probability of 
choosing (8,2) was very low, and the probability of choosing (5,5) was highest (see 
Figure 2). As scores on Factors 1 or 3 increased from extremely low to extremely 
high values, the probability of (5,5) monotonically declined, whereas the probability 
of (8,2) monotonically increased, with the two options being equiprobable at 
respective factor scores of two standard deviations above the mean for Factor 1 and 
one standard deviation above the mean for Factor 3. The probability of choosing 
Coin, on the other hand, exhibited an inverted-U shaped curve as factor scores 
increased from extremely low to extremely high values, reaching a maximum 
probability of roughly .55 - .65 when the factor score was half a standard deviation 
above the mean. That Factors 1 and 3 were informative predictors of choice in a 
simultaneous regression model strongly supported the social norms hypothesis, as 
                                                 
10
 For the Private condition, we used a binomial model to estimate the log-odds of (8,2) vs. (5,5), as there were only 
three Coin choices. 
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empirical and normative expectations predicted choice in the expected directions, 
even when controlling for the effects of profit-maximizing considerations. 
 In the private information condition, the predicted probability of the Proposer 
choosing (5,5) monotonically decreased as Factor 1 scores or Factor 4 scores 
increased (see Figure 3). Slightly above the mean score for Factor 1, and one 
standard deviation above the mean score for Factor 4, (5,5) and (8,2) were 
equiprobable. To reiterate, Factors 1 and 4 – which reflected beliefs that (8,2) overall 
and Coin in the full condition were fair and considered fair by others – were more 
informative predictors of choice than Factor 3, which reflected beliefs about the 
likelihood of (8,2) being accepted. This finding further supported the social norms 
hypothesis. Firstly, empirical and normative expectations were more predictive of 
choice than profit-maximizing considerations. Secondly, the effect of Factor 4 
suggested that only Proposers who were sensitive to social norms – i.e., those who 
believed Coin was empirically and normatively acceptable in the full information 
condition – chose (8,2) over (5,5) in the private condition; those who chose (5,5) 
over (8,2) in the private condition held first- and second-order beliefs that Coin was 
not fair in the full information condition. We return to this issue of patterns of 
choices across conditions in subsequent analyses.  
 Finally, in the limited information condition, as Factor 3 scores increased, the 
predicted probability of the Proposer choosing (5,5) monotonically declined, 
whereas the probability of (8,2) monotonically increased (see Figure 4). Profit-
maximizing motives therefore appeared to dominate in this condition, as Proposers 
knew that Responders could not distinguish between a choice of (8,2) and a choice 
of Coin which resulted in an offer of (8,2). In fact, only 48.3% and 53.1% of 
Proposers believed the majority of Responders would accept (8,2) in the full and 
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private information conditions, respectively, but 71.0% believed the majority of 
Responders would accept (8,2) in the limited condition.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted choice probabilities in the full information condition, by Factors 
1 and 2, based on the model in Table 5. To compute the predicted probability as a 
function of Factor 1 (left graph), the value of Factor 3 was held fixed at its mean. 
Analogously, the value of Factor 1 was held fixed at its mean in the right graph. 














































Figure 3. Predicted choice probabilities in the private information condition by 
Factors 1 and 4, based on the model in Table 5. To compute the predicted 
probability as a function of Factor 1 (left graph), the value of Factor 4 was held fixed 
at its mean. Analogously, the value of Factor 1 was held fixed at its mean in the right 
graph.  















































Figure 4. Predicted choice probabilities in the limited information condition by 
Factor 3. 
 
Patterns of Proposers’ Choices Across Conditions. We expected different patterns 
of correlated choices across conditions, with some choice patterns corresponding to 
Proposers who were sensitive to social norms of fairness, and other choice patterns 
corresponding to expected value maximization. According to the social norms 
hypothesis, in the full information condition, norm-following Proposers should 
choose Coin because they believed that the majority of Responders and Proposers 
considered Coin to be fair (see Table 3), whereas expected value maximizers should 
choose (5,5) or (8,2) based on their expected values. Because normative expectations 
for Coin were absent in the private information condition, both types should choose 
(5,5) or (8,2) based on their expected values, with the constraint that expected value 
maximizers should make the same choice in the full information condition, as their 
preferences are, by definition, insensitive to normative expectations. In the limited 
information condition, normative expectations for Coin were present (see Table 3), 






























but norm conformity could not be assessed by Responders due to the opacity of the 
offer source (a direct choice or the result of a coin flip). Thus, either (5,5) or (8,2) 
could be expected, with the constraint that any Proposer who chose (8,2) in the full 
or private conditions should choose (8,2) in the limited condition as well, as the 
probability of (8,2) being rejected in the latter condition is, ceteris paribus, lower 
than in the former conditions. To summarize, of the 27 possible patterns of choices 
across conditions, we expected to observe the following 6 patterns: Coin-(5,5)-(8,2), 
Coin-(8,2)-(8,2), Coin-(5,5)-(5,5), (5,5)-(5,5)-(5,5), (5,5)-(5,5)-(8,2), and (8,2)-(8,2)-
(8,2). 
Table 6 tabulates observed offer patterns across conditions. 24 of the 32 
observed patterns were contained in the list of expected patterns generated by the 
social norms hypothesis. The only offer pattern on our list of expected patterns for 
which there were no observations was (5,5)-(5,5)-(8,2). For the remaining observed 
offer patterns, the Proposer offered Coin in either the private or limited condition, 
with the exception of the pattern (8,2)-(8,2)-(5,5). On the whole, the observed 
patterns were consistent with predictions based on a theory of social norms.  
 




Basic theories of profit maximization were inadequate in explaining 
Proposers’ behavior, and did not provide an explanation for differences in beliefs or 
choice frequencies across information conditions. A theory of social norms 
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predicted, however, that participants would be focused on different fairness norms 
when we manipulated their first- and second-order fairness beliefs and that their 
behavior would vary accordingly. We replicated the basic findings of Bicchieri & 
Chavez (2010) by showing that the frequency of (8,2) was highest in the limited 
condition, in which Proposers could take advantage of the opacity of the source of 
their offer, and that the frequency of Coin was highest in the full information 
condition, in which Proposers could not ignore normative expectations to make a 
fair offer. Proposers’ beliefs varied in informative ways, revealing that the fairness 
of (8,2) and Coin and beliefs about whether (8,2) would be accepted were important 
directions of variation, and moreover, that they jointly explained choices. Choice 
patterns across conditions also followed patterns that were predicted by a theory of 
social norms, and individuals could be separated into two classes based on their 
choice patterns: those who generally offered (5,5) and believed (8,2) was unfair and 
unlikely to be accepted, and those who offered Coin or (8,2) whenever their 
likelihood of acceptance was high and who believed (8,2) was generally fair and 
likely to be accepted.  
By measuring Proposers’ beliefs about the fairness of each option and their 
beliefs about whether others considered each option to be fair, we were able to 
directly assess the presence and type of norm manipulation. In the full information 
condition, Proposers adopted an interpretation of the norm that best suited them by 
offering Coin. Under one theory of norm manipulation, Proposers could have 
considered Coin to be unfair but believed that Responders considered it to be fair. 
However, this was not the case; Proposers both believed Coin was fair and believed 
that others considered it fair. Moreover, Proposers exhibited self-serving biases in 
their beliefs when compared to Responders. Thus, in our data, norm manipulation 
did not operate as an explicit, calculating process in which individuals assessed 
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whether others viewed each option as normatively acceptable, and then selected the 
one that best suited them. Instead, it operated as an implicit process in which 
individuals’ self-serving biases in assessing the normative acceptability of different 
options drove behavior, consistent with the interpretations of Knez & Camerer 
(1995) of their behavioral data. 
We also found direct evidence consistent with the presence of norm evasion – 
the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. Despite their beliefs that (8,2) was 
unfair and was considered unfair by others in the limited condition, Proposers chose 
(8,2). Because Proposers’ choices were private, they intentionally ignored normative 
expectations in order to evade a norm of fairness with impunity. 
To conclude, we directly measured first and second-order fairness beliefs in 
bargaining games to understand norm manipulation and norm evasion, and add to 
previous behavioral studies that did not measure beliefs. In the study of Kagel et al. 
(1996) discussed in the Background, Proposers made even chip splits (uneven 
monetary splits) when both Proposers and Responders knew chip values. But in a 
separate condition in which only Proposers knew the chip values, Proposers also 
offered roughly even chip splits. Based on our findings, we hypothesize that 
Proposers’ beliefs were very different in these two conditions. In the first, it is likely 
that Proposers considered even chip splits to be fair as the result of a self-serving 
bias, as the authors infer. In the second, however, Proposers likely suffered no such 
self-serving bias, and instead simply believed that they were “getting away” with 
unfair behavior due to the informational asymmetry. Thus, norm manipulation and 
norm evasion are similar phenomena in their lack of norm conformity, but differ 
greatly in their psychological motivations. Norm manipulation is characterized by 
genuine, self-serving beliefs, as opposed to deliberate, calculated violations of a 
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norm when multiple interpretations are available. Norm evasion, on the other hand, 
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Rejection behavior by offer, information condition, and offer source (Coin or choice) 
  Offer 
Information Condition / Source (5,5)  (8,2) 
Full  
     From Coin 
     From choice 
Private 
Limited 
     
0.0% 0/12  0.0% 0/2 
0.0% 0/14  25.0% 1/4 
0.0% 0/21  36.4% 4/11 






Proposers’ beliefs about whether the majority of Responders would accept (5,5) and (8,2) by 
information condition and offer source. 
  Will the Majority of Responders accept? 
 (5,5)  (8,2) 
Information Condition / Source Yes No  Yes No 
Full  
     From Coin 
     From choice 
Private 
Limited 
     
32 0  25 7 
32 0  15 16 
32 0  17 15 
31 0  22 9 
 














Means (SEMs) for the Belief Data 
 Proposers Responders 
 Full Private Limited Full Private Limited 
Responders’ Empirical 
Expectations 
      












































      












What % of Proposers said 













What % of Responders said 
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Will the majority of 
Responders accept (8,2) not 













Will the majority of 
Responders accept (8,2) 













Note. The yes/no questions (“Is … a fair option?” and “Will the majority…?”) were dummy coded 
as 1 (yes) or 0 (no); therefore, the means for these questions were the proportions of individuals 






Factor Loadings for Proposers’ Belief Data from a Four-Factor EFA 
Variable Factor 1: 
Fairness of 
(8,2) 
Factor 2: Fairness 
of Coin-Limited 
Factor 3: Profit 
Maximization 
Factor 4: Fairness of 
Coin-Full 
(8,2) is fair     
Full 0.53 -0.28 -0.17  
Private 0.96    
Limited 0.93   0.14 
% of Proposers who 
said (8,2) is fair 
    
Full 0.46 0.09  0.32 
Private 0.71 0.36  -0.13 
Limited 0.77 0.33 -0.12 -0.17 
% of Responders who 
said (8,2) is fair 
    
Full 0.43 -0.11 0.17  
Private 0.46 0.11   
Limited 0.61  0.28 -0.19 
Coin is fair     
Full   0.14 0.76 
Limited 0.11 0.79   
% of Proposers who 
said Coin is fair 
    
Full  0.22  0.91 
Limited  0.91  0.16 
% of Responders who 
said Coin is fair 
    
Full  0.16  0.48 
Limited  0.84 0.12 0.11 
Majority of Responders 
will accept (8,2) 
    
Full 0.12  0.88 0.22 
Full (from coin) -0.24  0.66  
Private  0.18 0.72  
Limited  0.33 0.66 -0.44 
Proportion Var. 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.12 
Cumulative Var. 0.23 0.39 0.52 0.64 
Corr. Scores 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 
Note. Only loadings with a magnitude of at least 0.10 are shown. An oblimin rotation was applied. 




Logit Coefficients of Factor Scores as Predictors of Proposers’ Choice, by Information Condition 












Full      





Coin vs. (5,5) 0.33 0.20 - 1.38
*
 - 
Private      
(8,2) vs. (5,5) -0.58 1.54
*
 - - 0.83 
Limited       
(8,2) vs. (5,5) 0.07 - - 0.97
*
 - 
Coin vs. (5,5) -1.78
*
 - - 0.39 - 
∙
p < .10, 
*
p < .05. 




Tabulation of Offer Patterns Across Conditions 
 





Full Private Limited Count 
(5,5) (5,5) (5,5) 8 
Coin (8,2) (8,2) 5 
Coin (5,5) (5,5) 4 
Coin (5,5) (8,2) 4 
(8,2) (8,2) (8,2) 3 
(5,5) (5,5) Coin 2 
(5,5) (8,2) (8,2) 1 
(5,5) (8,2) Coin 1 
(5,5) Coin (5,5) 1 
(5,5) Coin (8,2) 1 
(8,2) (8,2) (5,5) 1 
Coin Coin (8,2) 1 
Total 32 
 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
